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TORT LAW-USE OF MECHANICAL DEVICES
IN THE DEFENSE OF PROPERTY*
***the law has always placed a higher value upon human safety than
upon mere rights in property, it is the accepted rule that there is no
privilege to utse any force calculated to cause death or serious bodily
injury to repel the threat to land or chattels, unless there is also such a
threat to the defendant's personal safety as to justify a self-defense.***
spring guns and other man-killing devices are not jistifiable against a
mere trespasser, or even a petty thief. They are privileged only against
those upon whom the landowner, if he were present in person, would
be free to inflict injury of the same kind.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of Katko v. Briney2 has reintroduced
the issue of the amount of force one may use to protect and de-
fend his property and the manner in which the possessor may
use this force. The issue deals with the privilege of inflicting
some degree of harm on another for the purpose of preventing
or terminating his intrusion and interference in the owner's
right of possession of land or chattels.
In general, the amount of force which a possessor has the
privilege to intentionally inflict depends on the nature of the
intrusion and the reaction of the intruder to the possessor's
initial use of force.3 The possessor is entitled to use only a rea-
sonable amount of force which he believes is necessary to pre-
vent or terminate the other's intrusion. A force may become
excessive if a reasonable man under similar circumstances
would realize that the harm likely to result is in excess of that
amount which the possessor is privileged to inflict.4 As in self
defense, the privilege to use force is limited to the amount
which reasonably appears necessary to prevent the intrusion.
As a general rule, it is a question of fact for the jury to
decide if the possessor of land uses reasonable force in the de-
fense of his property. However, this rule is subject to the
*Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W. 2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
1. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971), quoting from W.
PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF TORTS §21 (3d ed. 1964).
2. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
3. Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property By Dangerous
Barriers and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L.J. 525 (1926).
4. RESTATFAiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §81(1) (1965).
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qualification that no serious bodily injury has been inflicted
on the intruder. If the trespasser is killed or seriously injured
by a death trap such as a spring gun or by the possessor of the
land, the only defense the person setting the trap or doing the
killing can assert is that the injury was inflicted in defense of
person. Homicide or serious injury is clearly excessive and
therefore, neither is justified in defense of property.5
If it reasonably appears to the possessor that the intruder
threatens neither bodily harm to the possessor or those privi-
leged to use the land, nor physical harm to the property, then
the possessor is entitled to use only the minimum amount of
force required to eject the intruder or prevent his entrance to
the land. When the intrusion is wrongful, an "assault" on the
intruder is privileged only when the actor uses reasonable
means after he has unsuccessfully requested the intruder to
desist from the intrusion, when such a request would be useless
or dangerous, or when substantial harm would be done before
the request could be made.0
II. TYPES OF MECHANICAL DEVICES USED
IN THE DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
A possessor of land cannot be expected to be present at
all times to guard his property against intruders. Conse-
quently, means other than human guards have been employed
to protect property-these means include mechanical devices
such as barbed wire, spiked walls, spring guns, and watch-
dogs.
The types of mechanical devices used in defense of prop-
erty can be divided into two main groups-those which do not
threaten death or serious bodily harm and those likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm.
7
5. 1 T. COOLEY, TORTS, 343-344 (4th ed. 1932).
6. RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §77 (1965); 6 Am. JUR. 2d Assault
and Battery §167 (1963).
7. Bohlen and Bums, supra note 3, at 528; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §84 and §85 (1965).
In Hart, Injuries to Trespassers, 47 L.Q. REv. 92, 102-103 (1926), the au-
thor found this type of division inadequate as serious injury may result to a
trespasser from barbed wire, broken glass, or spiked walls. At the same time a
dilemma appears in the Restatement classification if one accepts the principle
that it is equally unlawful to do indirectly that which it is unlawful to do di-
[Vol. 24
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Common examples of the first type include barbed wire
and spiked walls.8 Since walls and fences are generally insuf-
ficient barriers against intruders, additional protection in the
form of spikes or railings, broken glass cemented on top of
walls, barbed wire fences or barbed wire strung along the top
of fences, is needed to impede a determined intruder. These
devices carry their own warning that prevent them from op-
erating as dangerous traps in the day time, while at night, such
devices are justified by rationalizing that where their use is
rectly. It is lawful for an owner to use spikes and glass on a wall "and yet, if
I were to see a trespasser coming down my area, or getting over the garden
vall, I could not drive the spike into his hand, or cut him with the glass."
Therefore this source sees the only acceptable division of mechanical devices
used for the protection of property as between "deterrent" and "retributive"
forces. The "deterrent" class of danger includes barbed wire, broken glass, and
spiked walls because they are obvious. The theory behind any deterrent force
is that the force is known to the intruder. Therefore, barbed wire or spiked
glass cannot be hidden behind hedges. The "retributive" dangers cover all
forces created to injure the trespasser. The dangers are not obvious but are
concealed, i.e. spring guns. The only time a "retributive" force could be justi-
fied would be if the injury were allowed while the owner was present and di-
rectly injured the intruder. Thus spring guns cannot be used deterrently and
may be used only when the owner would have been justified in personally firing
the shot.
8. Skaling v. Sheedy, 101 Conn. 545, 126 A. 721 (1924); Quigley v.
Clough, 173 Mass. 429, 53 N.E. 884 (1899).
The R STATMMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §84 (1965) takes the view that a
mechanical device not threatening death or serious bodily harm used for the pur-
pose of protecting land or chattels from intrusion is privileged if:
a) the use of such a device is reasonably necessary to protect the
land or chattels from intrusion, and
b) the use of the particular device is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, and
c) the device is one customarily used for such a purpose, or rea-
sonable care is taken to make its use known to probable in-
truders.
In the comments following §84, the American Law Institute stresses the reabon-
ableness of the device. In determining whether the device is a reasonable means
of protection, the jury must consider 1) the probability that the device will in-
flict any harm on the intruder, 2) the amount of harm the device is likely to in-
flict, 3) the impracticality of protecting the land by more discriminating means,
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common, the trespasser is said to know or should know of their
existence.9
This article puts more emphasis on this second type of
mechanical device which is considered dangerous enough to
cause great bodily harm. Although the common law allows an
owner to use reasonable force in protecting his property, the
overwhelming weight of authority holds that a possessor of
property is not privileged to set man traps o in protecting his
property unless, as a matter of law, he would have been justi-
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §84, comment f at 153. The Restate-
ment stresses the point that for such devices to be privileged, they must not be
concealed from possible intruders or used in such a way as would be reasonably
unlikely to be known by them. Thus they cannot be concealed by trees or
hedges. See also Rosenburg v. Tennant, 68 Colo. 80, 189 P. 25 (1920). This
was an action for injuries sustained by an automobile driver when his car col-
lided with a barbed wire fence across a corner of defendant's lot that had been
used as a short cut between streets. The defendant had put up a notice on the
lot that it was not to be used and also put up a note on a post when he built the
fence. The accident occurred the evening of the day the fence was built. The
court said:
If the defendant was guilty of actionable negligence, it must have
been due to his failure to give such notice of the obstruction
across the way as was reasonable under the circumstances . . .
the amount of travel over the cut off, the length of time it had
been used, (and the fact that persons thereon were trespassers)
were matters to be considered in determining the question of neg-
ligence.
10. "Man Traps" are devices likely to cause serious bodily injury that are
employed to catch trespassers. The most common examples are:
(1) spring guns -Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 (1873) ; State v. Green,
118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921) ; Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115
S.E. 686 (1923).
(2) digging pits across pathways-Dobbins v. M.K.&T. R.R., 91 Tex. 60,
41 S.W. 62 (1897).
(3) concealed bombs or dynamite-Phelps v. Hamlett, 207 S.W. 425 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918) ; Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120, 100 N.E.2d 237 (1951).
(4) electricity - Territory v. Warren, 119 F. 2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941).
See also Craig v. Kentucky Util. Co., 183 Ky. 274, 209 S.W. 33, (1919).
Employees of an electric company connected a live wire to a stockpile of wire
with the avowed intention of injuring thieves who were meddling with the
stockpile. A trespasser on the company's right of way seeking refuge in a storm
came in contact with the stored wire and was electrocuted. The court held that
the spring gun theory applied, and that if the employees had been working
within the scope of their employment, the company would have been liable.
4
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fied had he been personally present and inflicted the injury.".
Today the common law justifies the use of deadly force in the
defense of property only when the defense of habitation 12 is
concerned. 13 However, the rationale underlying this privilege
varies among jurisdictions, most of which base this privilege
not on a defense of property theory, but on a defense of the
owner and those within the household. Therefore, the use of
dangerous instrumentalities is privileged in these jurisdic-
tions only when the actor reasonably believes that the intru-
11. United States v. Gilliam, 1 Hayw. & H. 109, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319 (No.
15205a) (D.C. 1882) (spring gun set in goose house); Simpson v. State, 59
Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1 (1877) (spring gun set in garden) ; Hooker v. Miller, 37
Iowa 613, (1873) (spring gun set in orchard) ; State v. Beckman, 306 Mo. 566,
267 S.W. 817 (1924) (spring gun in food stand); Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio
St. 120, 100 N.E.2d 237 (1951) (dynamite trap in warehouse) ; Weis v. Allen,
147 Ore. 670, 35 P.2d 478 (1934) (spring gun in junkyard) ; Grant v. Hass, 31
Tex. Civ. App. 688, 75 S.W. 342 (1903) (spring gun in melon patch); Pierce
v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686 (1923) (spring gun in store);
State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 P. 939 (1907) (spring gun in trunk);
State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1895) (spring gun in cabin).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §85 (1965) concerning the use
of mechanical devices threatening death or serious bodily injury. The Restate-
ment provides:
The actor is so far privileged to use a device intended or likely
to cause serious harm or death for the purpose of protecting his
land or chattels from intrusion that he is not liable for the serious
bodily harm or death thereby caused to an intruder whose in-
trusion is, in fact, such that the actor were he present, would be
privileged to prevent or terminate it by the intentional infliction
of such harm.
12. Liberal definitions of the words "habitation" and "dwelling" have been
used to relieve property owners from liability. Today it is doubtful whether a
court would construe these words as liberally as was once done to circumvent
the spring gun theory.
In Schenernman v. Scharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (1909), an in-
truder was injured by a spring gun while attempting to burglarize a store. The
court concluded that: "A man's place of business (such as the defendant's store
in this case) is pro hoc vice his dwelling, and he has the same right to defend
it against intrusion, such as burglary, as he has to protect his dwelling."
In United States v. Gilliam, 1 Hayw. & H. 109, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319 (No.
15205a) (D.C. 1882), the court justified the killing by a spring gun of an in-
truder entering defendant's goose house with intent to steal by holding that the
goose house was within the "curtilage" of the dwelling house.
13. Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in The Protection of Property
Under The Model Penal Code, 59 CoLtm. L. REv. 1212, 1214-16 (1959).
19721
5
Garfinkle: Tort Law--Use of Mechanical Devices in the Defense of Property
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sion threatens a member of the household. 14 Other jurisdic-
tions do not require such an apprehension but emphasize the
protection of the habitation as property.'5
It should be noted that some courts have indicated that
the absence of notice of the dangerous mechanical device has
had a bearing on the outcome of the litigation.16 Thus, in
Starkey v. Dameron,'7 the court said:
... the setting of spring guns ... not within the privilege of the domi-
cil, without notice, would not justify or excuse the homicide which
14. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28 (1853) ; Fore v. Commonwealth,
291 Ky. 34, 38, 163 S.W.2d 48, 50 (1942) (dictum) ; Wooten v. State, 171 Tenn.
362, 103 S.W.2d 324 (1937); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 320-21 (1873)
(dictum) ; State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1893) ; and see Stat. 7 & 8
Geo. IV, c. 18 (1827) ; 14 & 15 Vict. ch. 19, sec. 4 (reenacted substantially in
1851), and 54 & 55 Vict. ch.69, sec.1 (1891) which makes setting of spring guns
a criminal offense except at night in a dwelling house.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND OF TORTS §79 (1965). The only time the
Restatement permits an actor to use a dangerous mechanical device likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury would be to repel an intruder who was in
fact threatening the owner or those under his protection. See RESTATE.MrENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs §85 (1965) mpra note 11.
The Restatement lists in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §143 comment on sub-
section 2 and RESTATEMENT §142(2) what crimes the intruder must in fact be
committing or threatening to commit in order for the owner to be absolved from
liability as a result of death or serious bodily injury to the intruder by a
mechanical device. Among these crimes are riot which threatens death or ser-
ious harm, murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, commonlaw rape,
kidnapping, and burglary.
Thus, when the actor is present, all that is needed to allow him to use
deadly force is a reasonable belief that the intruder threatens serious harm to
the actor or to those whom the actor is privileged to protect. However, when
an actor sets a mechanical device likely to cause great harm (i.e. spring gun),
the intruder must in fact be involved in an act that threatens serious harm to
the actor or those he is privileged to protect. An intruder who is not involved
in a crime of this nature is entitled to safety arising from the presence of a
human being capable of judging the character of the crime.
15. See, e.g., State v. Bradley, 126 S.C. 528, 533, 120 S.E. 240, 242 (1923).
In this case, the dicta seemed to support this property theory allowing the
owner to use deadly force in preventing a mere-forcible entry. See also Hall v.
State, 113 Ark. 454, 168 S.W. 1122 (1914) ; but see, State v. Green, 118 S.C.
279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921), which stressed the protection of person instead of
property in a case involving defense of habitation.
16. Scheuerman v. Sharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (1909) ; Starkey
v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 1112, 22 P.2d 640 (1933) ; Wilder v. Gard-
ner, 39 Ga. App. 608, 147 S.E. 911 (1929).
17. 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 1112, 22 P.2d 640 (1933).
[Vol. 24
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might ensue, but the party setting them would be criminally responsible
for the consequences of his act.18
However, the authors of the Restatement 9 assert that notice
is immaterial and that the owner is still liable. This argument
is based on the theory that a possessor of land cannot use
deadly force to prevent an intrusion that does not threaten the
possessor or those privileged to use the land; this is true even
if the possessor has personally warned the intruder that
deadly force will be used against him if he does not desist. The
same can be said of man traps. Even if the owner has in some
way warned the intruder, the owner will still be liable since he
cannot do indirectly that which, were he present, he could not
do in person. This view also seems to be the modern trend in
criminal courts.
20
Although this comment is restricted to a discussion of
dangerous mechanical devices used in the defense of property,
very brief mention will be made of an increasingly popular
method utilized today in protecting property-dangerous ani-
mals21 such as watchdogs. Liability for bodily harm caused
18. Id. at 421, 21 P.2d at 1113.
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS §85, comment a (1965). See also
Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 35 Am. Dec. 96 (1840) ; Bruister v. Haney,
233 Miss. 527, 102 So.2d 806 (1958). In the latter case, defendant land owner
placed poisoned food on his premises intending to injure or kill the plaintiff's
trespassing cattle. The land owner was held liable for the injury to or loss of
such animals poisoned by eating the food although he notified the owner of the
cattle of his intentions.
20. State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 689, 149 So. 425 (1933) ; State v. Childers,
133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d. 767 (1938) ; State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117,
92 P. 939 (1907) ; State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1895).
In State v. Green, 118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921), the deceased was
warned by his brother of rumors that a particular house had been dynamited.
The deceased entered the house and was killed by a spring gun. The court did
not deal with the question of notice but apparently concluded that such notice
did not justify the killing, and the manslaughter conviction was upheld.
21. "Dangerous animal" depends on the character of the animal and the
probability of its doing extreme injury. In Gerulis v. Lunecki, 284 Ill. App. 44,
1 N.E.2d 440 (1936), the court said that when watch dogs are kept for protec-
tion, the dangerous character and knowledge thereof may be inferred from their
size, their actual conduct, the admitted purpose for which they are kept, and the
care exercised in their custody. Where it appears that it is the custom to chain
up the dogs every morning and loosen them only at night-this action was held
to establish the scienter. Also, where a dog is kept chained it can be presumed
that the dog is vicious, unruly, and not safe to be permitted to go free.
1972]
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by watchdogs is somewhat complicated by various statutes,22
and the common law rule that the owner of an animal known
to have vicious propensities is strictly liable for the harm
caused by that animal.23 The usual rule concerning dangerous
animals and trespassers is that such animals must be bound
to protect even trespassers on the owner's premises; and
therefore the owner is not privileged to use the commission of
a trespass as a defense. 24 Although this rule is always applied
S.C. CoDE ANN. §6-151 (1962) defines a vicious dog as:
... any dog evidencing characteristics usually associated with a
dog abnormally inclined to attack or attempt to attack other ani-
mals or pcrsons without provocation by such other animal or per-
son.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §6-152 (1962) reads:
It shall be unlawful to own or keep a vicious dog within the con-
fines of Aiken, Anderson, Beaufort, Clarendon, Greenwood, New-
berry, Oconee or Richland Counties unless such vicious dog be
securely muzzled or securely confined within such owner's or
keeper's private premises.
CALIF. CIVIL CODE §3342 (1962) reads in part:
The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any
person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or law-
fully in a private place, including the property of the owner of
the dog, regardless of the former viciousness....
23. W. PRoSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS §21 (4th ed. 1971). An
example of the confusion is seen in Warner v. Wolfe, 176 Ohio St. 389, 199
N.E.2d 860 (1964). Here the Ohio Supreme Court held that a statute exempting
the owner of a dog from liability where the dog had injured a trespasser on the
owner's land, did not abrogate the common law right of action for damages due
to harboring vicious dogs. The court reversed the lower appellate court which
had held that the statute suspended this common law action.
24. 4 Am. JUR. 2d Animnals §105 (1962) ; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. N.Y.,
496 (1837); Conway v. Grant, 88 Ga. 40, 13 S.E. 803 (1891); Gerulis v.
Lunecki, 284 Ill. App. 44, 1 N.E.2d 440 (1936); Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171
Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933).
In Brewer v. Furtwangler, an unintentional trespasser was injured by the
defendant's dog that was known to the defendant-owner to be vicious. Defendant
had posted signs warning would-be trespassers against the dog. The plaintiff
testified that he did not see the signs. In this case liability was for the act of
knowingly keeping a vicious dog and not the negligence in the manner of keep-
ing the dog. The court said that contributory negligence was no defense to the
action.
See also Sanders v. O'Callaghan, 111 Iowa 574, 82 N.W. 969 (1900);
Sherfey v. Bartley 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 58, 67 Am. Dec. 597 (1856).
cf. Melcheimer v. Sullivan, 1 Colo. App. 22, 27 P. 17 (1891) ; Eberling v.
8
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to technical or unintentional trespassers, one still cannot use
unreasonable force even against criminal trespassers.5
The rules applied to vicious dogs kept by the owners to
defend his property from intruders are analogous to the rules
governing the use of mechanical devices in the protection of
property. 26 The safety of human life cannot be unnecessarily
endangered to protect property. The privilege of using watch-
dogs is to deter deliberate intrusions rather than inflict in-
jury on the trespasser. This kind of protection can be com-
pared to the deterrent force of mechanical devices used in the
defense of property that do not cause serious bodily injury to
the intruder. If the animal does not have vicious propensities,
it can be used to prevent trespassing, provided that reasonable
care has been taken to warn intruders of the dog's presence or
provided that keeping such dogs is customary within the com-
munity.
27
III. KATKO v. BRINEY
In Katko v. Briney2U the Iowa Supreme Court held that
the owners of an uninhabited farm house were liable for the in-
juries of a trespasser who broke and entered setting off a
spring gun. The Kctko court affirmed the lower court's in-
structions stating the general rules pertaining to the defense
of property (see Introduction) :
Mutillod, 90 NJ.L. 478, 101 A. 519 (1917); Spellman v. Dyer, 186 Mass. 176,
71 N.E. 295 (1904).
Although the owner of a vicious dog is liable for injuries inflicted by it
even in his own premises, some old courts have relieved the owner of liability
where one has come onto the owner's property at night either while trespassing
or incautiously coming on the owner's property. See Montgomery v. Koester,
35 La. Ann., 1091 (1883) ; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 496 (1837) ; Mc-
Caskill v. Elliot, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strobh) 196 (1850).
25. Brewer v. Furtwangler, 171 Wash. 617, 18 P.2d 837 (1933). See also
Introduction, supra.
26. W. PRossER, TORT §21 (4th ed. 1971) ; 1 F. HARER AND F. JAmEs, THE
LAw OF TORTS §3.13 (1956) ; RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs §516 (1938) reads:
A possessor of land or chattels is privileged to employ a dog or
other animal, for the purpose of protecting his possession of land
or chattels from intrusion, to the same extent that he is privi-
leged to use a mechanical protective device for such purposes.
27. 1 F. HARPER AND F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS §3.13 (1956). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §516, comment b (1938). See also note 9 supra.
28. 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
19721
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Instruction 5 provides-You are hereby instructed that one may use
reasonable force in the protection of his property, but such right is sub-
ject to the qualification that one may not use such means of force as
will take human life or inflict great bodily injury. Such is the rule
even though the injured party is a trespasser and is in violation of the
law himself.
Instruction 6-An owner of premises is prohibited from willfully or
intentionally injuring a trespasser by means of force that either takes
life or inflicts great bodily injury; and therefore a person owning a
premise is prohibited from setting out 'spring guns' and like dangerous
devices which will likely take life or inflict great bodily injury, for the
purpose of harming trespassers. The fact that the trespasser may be
acting in violation of the law does not change the rule. The only time
when such conduct of setting a 'spring gun' or a like dangerous device
is justified would be when the trespasser was committing a felony of
violence or a felony punishable by death, or where the trespasser was
endangering human life by his act.
2 9
The theory behind the liability of those setting spring
guns rests on the assumption that the owner expects a tres-
passer and has prepared a trap which the owner of the prop-
erty knows or should know could inflict serious bodily harm.30
A defendant is no more justified in using a gun as a trap than
if he had personally fired the gun. As the instruction states
above, the only instance in which he is privileged to fire the
gun is if he reasonably believes he, or those under his protec-
tion, is in serious danger of bodily harm. Consideration for
humanity precludes him from setting dangerous traps for
those whose appearances may be reasonably anticipated. 3'
The Katko court is supported by a line of civil and crim-
inal cases which have held the owner liable for harm caused to
a trespasser or petty thief by a spring gun.3 2 England has a
statute expressly prohibiting spring guns and other man traps
except by night and for the protection of a dwelling-house.3 3
29. Id. at 659.
30. United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1921).
31. Phelps v. Hamlett, 207 S.W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). This case is
discussed in note 46 infra.
32. Starkey v. Dameron, 96 Colo. 459, 21 P.2d 1112, 22 P.2d 640 (1933);
Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 (1873) ; State v. Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So.
425 (1933); State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924); State v.
Childers, 133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d 767 (1938); Weis v. Allen, 147 Or. 670,
35 P.2d 478 (1934); State v. Green, 118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921).
33. Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch. 18 (1827) ; 14 & 15 Vict. ch. 19, sec. 4 (reen-
acted substantially in 1851) and 54 & 55 Vict. ch. 69, sec. 1 (1891).
[Vol. 24
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The Restatement of Torts takes a similar view prohibiting the
use of mechanical devices threatening serious bodily harm ex-
cept to prevent such harm. 34 South Carolina is one of the few
states which prohibit spring guns by statute.3 5
In Katko, the plaintiff-trespasser was committing a lar-
ceny at the time the spring gun discharged. 36 Defendants
Briney and his wife were the owners of an uninhabited house
on an 80-acre tract of land. During the ten years prior to the
shooting, there occurred a series of break-ins with resultant
loss of household items. In an attempt to stop the break-ins,
defendant boarded up the windows, posted "no trespass" signs,
and complained to the sheriff on numerous occasions; the van-
dalism continued.37 Finally defendants set up "a shotgun trap"
inside the house. At first the gun was pointed to hit the in-
truder in the stomach, but later the gun was lowered so that it
was aimed to hit the legs. No warnings were posted concern-
ing the trap, and the gun could not be seen from the outside.
Before the trap was set the injured plaintiff had been to the
house and had long considered it abandoned. On entering the
house, he opened the bedroom door discharging the shot gun.
Plaintiff's right leg was severely injured. Plaintiff pleaded
guilty to larceny in the nighttime, was fined and paroled.
38
The defendants contended that the law permits spring
guns in houses or warehouses to prevent the unlawful entry of
a burglar or thief and took exception to the instructions noted
above in addition to instructions stating that the law prohibits
the setting of spring guns except to prevent felonies of vio-
lence, and when human life is in danger. The lower court
stated that breaking and entering in this instance was not a
felony of violence. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower
court instructions in affirming the decision for the trespassing
plaintiff.39 The court cited a previous Iowa decision on the
34. See note 11 supra.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. §16-143 (1962) reads in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to construct, set or place a
loaded trap gun, spring gun or any like device in any manner in
any building or in any place within this state, and any violation
of the provisions of this section shall constitute a misde-
meanor....
36. 183 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Iowa 1971).
37. Id. at 664.
38. Id. at 658-659.
39. Id. at 662.
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same subject, Hooker v. Miller,40 in which the Iowa Supreme
Court found the owner of a vineyard liable to a trespasser who
set off a spring gun at night while stealing grapes. That court
said: "[T] respassers and other inconsiderable violators of the
law are not to be visited by barbarious punishments or pre-
vented by inhuman infliction of bodily injuries."'
1
In Allison v. Fiscus,42 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized
that a property owner is not justified in inflicting serious
bodily harm on a trespasser by traps, spring guns, or other
dangerous mechanical devices unless, as a matter of law, he
would have been justified in doing the same thing if he had
been present. However, this court reversed and remanded the
case in order for the jury to decide whether the trap used by
the owner was a force reasonably necessary to protect his
property against a trespasser who intended to feloniously steal
the owner's chattels. The dissent in Katko agreed with the
Ohio court that concluded:
[Tihe court had no right to hold as a matter of law that defendant
was liable to plaintiff, as the defendant's good faith in using the force
which he did to protect his building and the good faith of his belief as
to the nature of the force he was using were questions for the jury to
determine under proper instruction. (Emphasis supplied.)
43
The Katko dissent argued that the jury must find intent
on the part of the possessor to seriously injure or to kill the
trespasser with the spring gun as well as the use of unreason-
able force by the possessor. The dissenting judge believed that
the mere setting of such a device with a resultant serious in-
jury should not, as a matter of law, have established liability.
44
The dissent agreed with the defendant that the lower
court confused the issue of intent in its instructions by imply-
ing that there is absolute liability when spring guns are used
except in protecting human life from serious injury. This as-
sertion is correct if the instructions are taken as a whole. The
lower court's additional instructions to the jury stated that in
order for plaintiff to recover, the jury must find by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the following:
40. 37 Iowa 613, (1813).
41. Id. at 617.
42. 156 Ohio St. 120, 100 N.E.2d 237 (1951).
43. Id. at 124, 100 N.E.2d at 241.
44. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657. 662, 667 (Iowa 1971).
[Vol. 24
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [], Art. 18
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss1/18
COMMENTS
1. That defendants erected a shotgun trap in a vacant house on land
owned by defendant.., to protect household goods from trespassers
and thieves.
2. That the force used by defendants was in excess of that force rea-
sonably necessary and which persons are entitled to use in the pro-
tection of their property.
3. That plaintiff was injured and damaged....
4. That plaintiff's injuries and damages resulted directly from the dis-
charge of the shotgun trap which was set and used by defendants. 45
There was really no question of fact in Katko other than dam-
ages since there was no conflicting testimony. The court in
instruction six had already stated emphatically that the only
time setting up a spring gun was justified would be if the tres-
passer was committing a crime of violence (which the court
said the plaintiff was not) or when the trespasser was en-
dangering human life. The dissent is correct in asserting that
the majority is in fact setting up an absolute liability theory
for spring guns, a theory in which intent (whether to frighten
or seriously injure) is immaterial to the question of liability.
It should be noted that there are a few courts which have
also stated that the use of spring guns-except in defense of a
dwelling house-is excessive, unreasonable, and unjustifiable
as a matter of law.
4"
45. Id. at 659-660.
46. Starkey v. Darneron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 1112, 22 P.2d 640 (1933).
In this case, a spring gun had been concealed in an automatic gasoline pump at
a filling station. The trap injured a person alleged to have been trying to break
into the pump. The court upheld a lower court instruction which stated that the
owner of the pump was liable to the alleged intruder, and that the only question
for the jury concerned the amount of damages to be awarded.
Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 (1873). This court stated that the use of a
deadly weapon such as a spring gun could not be justified in the defense of
property. Thus it seems that the Katko court followed the Hooker v. Miller
precedent while the Katko dissent intrepreted the case in a narrow sense by
proclaiming that the Hooker court held that spring guns could not be used to
injure a mere trespasser in a vineyard. The dissent believes that a distinction
must be made between a vineyard and an unoccupied dwelling.
Phelps v. Hamlett, 207 S.W. 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). In this case, the
court reversed a decision for a defendant who placed a bomb near the entrance
of an open air theater so that it would be set off by someone opening the door.
The court said the defendant was liable for injuries to a child caused by the
explosion of the bomb, although the child was a trespasser.
The reasoning behind these decisions is made clear by the dissenting
opinion in Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio 120, 100 N.E. 237 (1951). There, the
dissent points out that the defendant, not being present, could not have been in
1972]
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IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Although the Katko decision is a civil case, it should be
noted that where a homicide results from the use of spring
guns, the persons responsible for setting such a trap may be
indicted for murder or manslaughter. In the South Carolina
case of State v. Green,4 7 the defendant owner set a spring gun
in his house which he frequently used during the year. Thefts
from the home while he was away prompted the owner to lock
the gate surrounding the house, as well as the front door, and
to place two locks on the door of the room in which the spring
gun was placed. The intruder, who was killed by the trap, had
even heard that the house had been dynamited. The court in
upholding a manslaughter conviction said that if the defen-
dant owner had been present and had killed the intruder, it
would have been necessary to show by way of defense that the
circumstances were not only sufficient to justify a person of
ordinary firmness and reason in believing that he was in
danger of losing his life, or suffering serious bodily harm, but
that he himself had so believed. The court said that with de-
fendant not present, it was impossible for him at the time of
the killing, to comply with those requirements.
48
danger of death or great bodily harm, and could have had no reasonable grounds
for the belief that he was. Not being present, the defendant could not have be-
lieved in good faith that the force which he used was necessary to compel the
plaintiff to desist from his purpose of stealing the defendant's property. He
could not have known what force, if any, was so necessary.
The court in Grant v. Hass, 31 Tex. Civ App. 688, 75 S.W. 342 (1903)
faced a situation in which a spring gun shot an innocent person. The court
commented on the issue of intent by saying that every man is held to the neces-
sary, natural, and probable consequences of his act, the contemplation of which
the law presumes, whether or not he does so in fact. The same reasoning can be
used in understanding the Katko decision in that even if the spring gun was set
to scare or frighten away the intruder, the persons responsible for setting the
trap undertook by that means to put into motion a deadly weapon that the de-
fendants should have known could inflict serious bodily injury.
47. 118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921).
48. Id. at 290, 110 S.E. at 148. This reasoning is in keeping with the trend
of modern authorities which follow the general rule that one may not use man
traps for the sole purpose of protecting property. See, e.g., State v. Beckham,
306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924). The deceased was armed with a gun and
had burglary tools in his possession when a spring gun went off while deceased
was breaking into defendant's food stand. Defendant store owner was con-
victed of manslaughter. State v. Childers, 133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d 797
Vol. 24
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This South Carolina case cited the ruling of State v.
Barr49 which stressed the point that except during the bur-
glary of a dwelling house when occupied by the owner or some
member of his family, there is no greater reason for using ex-
treme means such as spring guns and other dangerous devices
in preventing burglary of an unoccupied dwelling than in pre-
venting other felonies not involving danger to humans. 50
V. CONCLUSION
The law has always placed a higher value on human safety
than upon mere property rights.51 The Katko decision sup-
ports this rule by stressing that the issue presented was
whether deadly force could be used in the protection of prop-
erty-safety for the land owners was not a factor in this case.
The court said:
The primary issue ... is whether an owner may protect personal prop-
erty in a boarded-up farm house against trespassers and thieves by a
spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.
We are not here concerned with a man's right to protect his home
and members of his family .... 52
(1938). In this case, the owner of a melon patch set six spring guns in his
patch. Owner was convicted of unlawfully shooting with intent to wound a 14
year old boy who was attempting to steal watermelons.
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686 (1923). A merchant
whose store had been burglarized previously, set a spring gun to guard his store
against further break-ins. Although the court reversed this case on technical
grounds, the court said that the store owner could be found guilty of such
wanton and reckless disregard for the safety of others and that he could be con-
victed of second degree murder. In this case, a policeman was killed by the
gun while in the performance of his duty in attempting to test the door to the
store.
State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1895). The deceased, in attempt-
ing to enter a boarded-up cabin in the woods was killed by a spring gun set by
the defendant. In upholding a second degree murder conviction, the court said
that the lower court was warranted in instructing that the defendant had no
right to use such a dangerous device to protect his property.
See also cases on spring guns collected in 19 A.L.R. 1437 (1922), 28 A.L.R.
873 (1924), 37 A.L.R. 1100 (1925), 44 A.L.R.2d 383 (1955). See generally
Comment, The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Property under the
Model Penal Code, 59 COLUtm. L.R. 1212 (1959).
49. 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1895).
50. Id. at 483, 39 P. at 1082.
51. See note 1 supra.
52. Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
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This case received national attention in newspapers 53 and on
national news programs. A prowler, who is fined $50 for lar-
ceny and paroled, collects $30,000 from a farm couple who
sought to protect household items in their abandoned farm
house. Although the items Katko sought to steal amounted to
old bottles and fruit jars,54 the same rule applied to this deci-
sion would apply to a store owner who seeks to protect valu-
able goods. As Katko v. Briney55 shows, the trend is still
strong in supporting the belief that where property alone is to
be protected, care must be taken to use only so much force as
is reasonably necessary for the protection of property and no
more. An owner who employs a mechanical device in defend-
ing his property against unprivileged intrusions must use one
which would deter a would-be intruder and only slightly injure
the determined intruder. Any force calculated to inflict an in-
jury considered serious would be held unreasonable and exces-
sive, and the owner responsible for such a dangerous force
could be held criminally, as well as civilly liable for the damage
inflicted.
M. JERRY GARFINKLE
53. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Feb. 10, 1971, at 1A-7, col. 5-7; New York
Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 32, col. 1.
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